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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Valentin Calvillo appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a child 
and lewd conduct with a minor. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Calvillo was indicted for eight counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
minor and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, for which he first went to trial in 
2010.  (#39529 R., pp. 11-15, 48-52, 56.)  In the middle of trial Calvillo fled the 
country; the trial carried on without him, and he was found guilty of seven counts 
of lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse.  (#39529 R., pp. 208-14, 247-
50.)1 
Calvillo petitioned for post-conviction relief.  (R., p. 116.)  The state 
stipulated that Calvillo’s original trial counsel was ineffective and his petition was 
granted.  (R., p. 116.)  Calvillo’s convictions were vacated and the district court 
ordered a new trial.  (R., pp. 116, 171.) 
Prior to the second trial, the state served a notice of intent to present 
evidence of Calvillo’s flight from the original trial.  (R., pp. 92-98.)  This request 
was denied by the district court, which noted Calvillo’s explanations for the flight 
“may necessarily bring into evidence his prior verdict of guilty which would clearly 
prejudice the defendant and which this court would not want to be before a new 
jury.” (R., p. 122.)  The district court denied the state’s motion, concluding that “if 
                                            
1 Of the ten counts originally charged one count of sexual abuse was dismissed 
on the defendant’s motion during the first trial.  (#39529 R., pp. 208-09.)   
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the circumstances of the defendant’s prior jury trial and the outcome of that trial 
were before the new jury the prejudicial effect of the prior trial proceedings would 
substantially outweigh the probative value of the flight evidence in the State’s 
case in chief.”  (R., p. 123.) 
In 2016 a new trial was held on eight charges of lewd conduct and one 
charge of sexual abuse.  (R., p. 140.)  Just before voir dire, the district court 
issued the following jury instruction: 
Likewise, none of the statements, opinions, or beliefs expressed by 
any of you prospective jurors are evidence in this case, and you 
should not permit any such statements, opinions, or beliefs to 
influence your decision if you are selected to be a juror in this case. 
 
(Tr. p. 35, Ls. 10-15.)   
 During voir dire, in response to the district court’s question whether any 
potential juror had prior knowledge related to the case (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 19-25), the 
court and a potential juror had the following exchange: 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Juror Number 65, … what is 
your source of information of this case? 
 
JUROR 65: I worked at the jail as a nurse while Mr. Calvillo was 
incarcerated. 
 
(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 3-7).  This juror was immediately excused by the district court.  
(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 8-9.)  The court then had the following exchange with another 
potential juror: 
THE COURT: … Juror Number 70, … what is your source of 
information of this case? 
 
JUROR 70: I had a professional relationship with the defendant. 
 




JUROR 70: It was about 2008 until about the time he went missing. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. And that was—so have you had any dealings 
with the defendant since 2008? 
 
JUROR 70: No, sir. 
 
(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 10-20.)  This prospective juror was likewise dismissed by the 
court.  (Tr., p. 37, L. 25 – p. 38, L. 7.)  No other juror mentioned Calvillo’s 
incarceration or the fact that he “went missing.”  (See generally, Tr.) 
 Calvillo’s attorney moved for a mistrial based on the two statements, 
arguing that the jurors “infected ... the entire panel with information related to 
Mr. Calvillo’s incarceration” and “information that in someway, somehow, he went 
missing.”  (Tr., p. 152, L. 6 – p. 154, L. 14.)  The district court denied the motion: 
THE COURT: All right. Well, the Court does recognize that whether 
or not to grant a mistrial is a matter of discretion for the trial court. 
The Court is to exercise its discretion within its legal bounds 
through an exercise of reason. 
 
My recollection is that the jurors that were excused—I believe … 
Juror 70, indicated that he had a professional relationship with 
Mr. Calvillo, that that relationship was for approximately 2 years in 
2008. [Juror 70] did say—and the word I heard was “when he was 
missing.” The exact phrase—certainly, he did not couch that 
statement in the context of this case, and the jurors were previously 
instructed by this Court that the statements of any jurors during the 
course of voir dire are not evidence for purposes of this 
proceeding. My assumption is that those jurors, assuming they 
recall that statement, will follow that instruction.  
 
… Juror 48, indicated that she was familiar with the defendant from 
her work in the jail, I believe, as a nurse. Certainly, there’s an 
inference there that Mr. Calvillo was, perhaps, incarcerated at 
some time. While I think it is an unfortunate statement, I do not 
believe that it is a basis for a mistrial. 
 
All of the jurors who remain have promised that they would decide 
this case solely based upon the evidence presented here. 
Certainly, the two offending jurors were previously excused, so 
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there is no possible further contamination, and so the Court would 
deny the request for mistrial at this time. 
 
(Tr., p. 154, L. 20 – p. 155, L. 23.)  Calvillo’s counsel appeared to preserve his 
objection to the panel when he stated “[w]ith that, Judge, just for the record, I will 
pass the panel for cause, withholding that objection.”  (Tr., p. 156, Ls. 1-3; see 
also p. 151, L. 25 – p. 152, L. 5.)  Calvillo did not challenge any jurors for cause.  
(Confidential Ex., pp. 5-8;2 see also, Tr., pp. 76-150.)  
 The victim testified against Calvillo.  (Tr., pp. 326-423.)  Of note, when the 
victim was asked “how much longer was [Calvillo] living in the house” after the 
abuse was reported, she testified that “I think two more days, because the next 
day, my mom took me to a clinic and—or maybe it might have been just one 
day—and then the police came and took him.”  (Tr., p. 341, Ls. 19-25.) 
 Following the presentation of evidence the jury presented two questions to 
the court, asking “Does a verdict on a count have to be unanimous? … or how 
do we mark it if we are dead locked?”  (Confidential Ex., p. 9; see Tr., p. 537, 
L. 9 – p. 538, L. 22.)  The jury did not ask any questions about Calvillo’s prior 




                                            
2 Citations to “Confidential Ex.” refer to the PDF file of confidential exhibits on 
appeal comprised of, among other things, the juror roll call sheet, the questions 




 The jury acquitted Calvillo of one count of lewd conduct but found him 
guilty of the remaining count of sexual abuse and six counts of lewd conduct.3  
(Tr., p. 541, L. 23 – p. 543, L. 8.)  The district court entered a judgment of 
conviction and sentenced Calvillo to 30 years in prison with 15 years fixed.  (R., 
pp. 261-65.) 
 Calvillo timely appealed.  (R., pp. 278-82, 298-303.)   
                                            
3 After the state rested one count of lewd conduct was dismissed pursuant to 





Calvillo states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Was Mr. Calvillo’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury violated 
due to the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial after two 
prospective jurors told the entire jury panel that Mr. Calvillo was 
incarcerated and went missing? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 






Calvillo Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Motion 
For A Mistrial 
 
A. Introduction 
 Calvillo argues he was deprived of his due process right to trial by an 
impartial jury.  He contends that the settled standard of review should not apply 
here, and rather, this Court should “clarify that the jury’s exposure to a 
prospective juror’s prejudicial statement during voir dire is a structural defect.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Calvillo argues that under such a standard the district 
court erred by not granting a mistrial based on the jury’s exposure to comments 
about his incarceration, and that he “went missing.”   (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-
16.) 
 These arguments fail.  The well-settled standard for a review of a denial 
for a mistrial motion applies here, and under it, neither the incarceration 
comment nor the “went missing” were grounds for a mistrial.  The district court 
therefore correctly denied Calvillo’s motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review for a denial of a motion for mistrial is well 
established: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
“abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the 
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continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the 
mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be 
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 
 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68, 253 P.3d 727, 742 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)).  This standard of review 
has been applied in Idaho for decades and is “well-settled” law in the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s view.  Ellington, 151 Idaho at 68, 253 P.3d at 742; see also 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285; State v. Sandoval-Tena, 
138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003); State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 
54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34, 
752 P.2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 94-95, 665 
P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Ct. App. 1983).  Under this standard Calvillo bears the 
burden of showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied 
his motion for a mistrial.  State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 1029, 
1032 (Ct. App. 1983).  Thus, the appellate court reviews the full record to 
determine if the event that triggered the motion for mistrial “represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.”  Id. 
Calvillo proposes upending this settled standard of review, arguing that 
applying it here improperly “combines the reversible and harmless error 
standard” due to the retrospective focus on the “context of the full record.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)  Calvillo contends that juror exposure to an allegedly 
prejudicial statement during voir dire is a structural defect necessitating a 
reversible error review that does not look at the alleged error in the context of the 
entire record.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) 
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 But the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that controlling 
precedent will not be overruled “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to 
vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.”  
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).  
See also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
(“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 
440-52, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring) 
(“While it may seem that stare decisis is a rule of convenience, it is not.  I believe 
that this rule requires us to stand by our prior decisions unless there are 
compelling and cogent reasons that necessitate a departure from our prior 
rulings.”)  
Calvillo fails to show that the settled standard of review is manifestly 
wrong and fails to give compelling reasons for jettisoning it.  Calvillo 
acknowledges the existing standard as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court but 
claims it conflicts with State v. Perry.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8 (citing State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209,  245 P.3d 961 (2010)).)  However, the Ellington Court 
expressly reaffirmed the standard of review the year after Perry was decided.  
Ellington,  151 Idaho at 68, 253 P.3d 727, 742.  Had the Idaho Supreme Court 
 
 10 
wished to disrupt the established law in light of Perry it could have done so; 
instead, it reaffirmed the standard and called it “well-settled.”4  Id. 
Calvillo’s main objection is to the standard of review’s focus on the entire 
context of the proceedings.  He asks this Court to “clarify that the jury’s exposure 
to a prospective juror’s prejudicial statement during voir dire is a structural 
defect” and by definition incompatible with a review that looks to “if, and how, the 
error ultimately impacted the trial.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8, 10.) 
This argument fails first because the state is unaware of, nor does Calvillo 
cite to, any controlling United States Supreme Court or Idaho authority holding 
that mere exposure to potentially prejudicial statements during voir dire 
constitutes structural error.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 4 (citing to Perry, 150 
Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974).) 
But beyond that, framing the issue this way misses the distinction 
between exposure to allegedly prejudicial statements and the second-order 
question of whether the jury was irreparably biased after hearing them.  As 
explained more fully below, not all potentially prejudicial comments create an 
                                            
4 Calvillo claims the Ellington Court “appeared to recognize” an inconsistency 
between the settled standard and Perry but fails to support this argument.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Calvillo finds significance in the Ellington Court “explicitly 
[declining] to evaluate whether the alleged constitutional error (jury bias) was 
harmless or reversible.”  (Appellant’s, brief, p. 8.)  But of course, as Calvillo 
himself quickly admits, the Court only declined to evaluate the effect of the 
alleged error because it concluded there was no error in the first place—“the 
defendant failed to show prospective jurors’ statements biased the empaneled 
jurors.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 253 P.3d 961).)  So 
one cannot infer that the Ellington Court was saying anything about how to 





incurably biased jury.  See State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 
128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630-31, 97 P.3d 1014, 
1019-20 (Ct. App. 2004).  Courts accordingly possess a range of remedies short 
of granting a mistrial—such as curative instructions—to address such 
statements.  See, e.g., Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020.  Logically, one 
can only address the second question—was the jury irreparably biased—by 
looking at what happened at trial after the prejudicial statement was made, and 
after the district court ruled on the mistrial motion.  By temporal necessity a 
reviewing court must look at the entire trial to determine whether the prejudicial 
statement nevertheless implicitly biased the jury or had a “devastating” impact on 
the trial, or whether the district court’s curative actions were successful.5  See id.  




                                            
5 By contrast, treating all prejudicial statements as structural defects would be 
incapable of answering the relevant question: whether the district court correctly 
determined that the trial could proceed with an impartial jury without the remedy 
of a full-blown mistrial.  If this Court defenestrated the established standard of 
review and applied a structural defect standard in every prejudicial-comment 
case, proving an a comment’s prejudice to the slightest degree would secure 
reversal on appeal.  And mistrials would likely be granted for every potentially 
prejudicial statement; because why carry on with the proceedings if the reviewing 
court would be unable to consider the rest of the trial? This unforgiving approach, 
beyond being uneconomic and unrequired by controlling authority, would go in 
stark contrast to the constitutional standard: due process does not require 
perfect trials, just fair ones.  See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 
273, 285 (2007) (citing State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 
132-33 (1986)).   
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Because not every prejudicial statement creates an irreparably biased jury 
the district court’s decision on a mistrial motion is necessarily forward-looking. 
And to assess whether the district court erred, the reviewing court naturally looks 
to the entire record following the ruling.  This standard of review is well 
established over the decades, applies here, and Calvillo has failed to show that it 
should be overruled.    
 
C. Calvillo Has Failed To Show The District Court’s Jury Instructions Were 
Insufficient To Cure Any Potential Prejudice Caused By Statements 
Regarding His Prior Incarceration 
 
Trial by an impartial jury is a criminal defendant’s constitutional right.  U.S. 
Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13; Ellington, 151 Idaho at 
69, 253 P.3d at 743.  A fair trial, however, is “not necessarily a perfect trial.”  See 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (citing State v. 
Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 (1986)).  Consequently, 
“[t]he admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the 
declaration of a mistrial.”  Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136.   
 Jurors are “presumed to be impartial”: 
 
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair 
cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of 
individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as 
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn 
duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. 
 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 
476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986); see also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69, 253 P.3d 
at 743 (“The trial court does not need to find jurors that are entirely ignorant of 
the facts and issues involved in the case. To hold that the mere existence of any 
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preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to 
establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in 
court.”).  Thus, “[w]here improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial 
and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is 
ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court’s instruction entirely.”  Hill, 
140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020. 
 Defendants may challenge the presumption of juror impartiality for “‘actual 
or implied’ bias.”  State v. Lankford, 2017 WL 2838135, __ P.3d __ (Idaho, July 
3, 2017) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)); State v. 
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 421, 348 P.3d 1, 36 (2014).  Implied bias, as it seems 
Calvillo contends lurked here, “conclusively presumes bias as a matter of law 
based on the existence of a specific fact.”6  Lankford, 2017 WL 2838135 (citing 
to Wood, 299 U.S. at 133); I.C. § 19-2018(2). 
                                            
6 Calvillo has not stated on appeal whether he thinks the jurors were actually or 
impliedly biased, but one presumes he claims the latter.  Alternatively, Calvillo 
has waived any claim that any jurors were actually biased as he did not contend 
below that any jurors were actually biased.  State v. Garcia–Rodriguez, 2017 WL 
2569786, *3 (June 14, 2017) (“Issues not raised below will not be considered by 
this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the 
case was presented to the lower court.”).  He has also waived the issue 
because, despite his trial counsel averring actually seeing specific jurors 
exhibiting “what I believed to be, physical reactions”—such as heads jerking and 
eyes widening in reaction to the allegedly prejudicial statements—counsel invited 
any such error by never moving to strike any of those jurors for cause.  (See 
Confidential Ex. p. 9; see Tr., p. 36, Ls. 1 – p. 150, L. 18; p. 154, Ls. 5-14);  see 
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 501, 660 P.2d 1336, 1344 (1983) (“Even though 
apparently dissatisfied with the jury panel, appellant did not challenge any juror 
for cause nor exercise all of her peremptory challenges. Having failed to exhaust 
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 But the presumption that the jury “will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence” can only be overcome by showing there is an 
“‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s 
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
‘devastating’ to the defendant.”  Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (quoting 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766, n. 8 (1987)).  In other words, Idaho courts ask 
whether the allegedly improper evidence had a “continuing impact on the trial.”  
State v. Laymon, 140 Idaho 768, 770, 101 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2004) (where 
the court found defendant was not deprived of a fair trial because “there is no 
evidence that the jury here did not follow the trial court’s instructions,” the 
improper-comment making juror was removed, there was “no evidence that her 
statements had but a passing, inconsequential effect on the remaining pool 
members,” and there was “nothing in the record to show that the potential juror’s 
views about the previous week’s aborted trial had a continuing impact” on the 
trial). 
 Here, Calvillo has failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors did not 
follow the court’s instructions to disregard juror statements.  He likewise fails to 
show that the comment that he was incarcerated had a devastating impact on 
him or had any continuing impact on the trial.  Before the incarceration comment 
was made the jury was specifically instructed that: 
                                                                                                                                  
the means available to her to exclude unacceptable jurors, appellant cannot now 





Likewise, none of the statements, opinions, or beliefs expressed by 
any of you prospective jurors are evidence in this case, and you 
should not permit any such statements, opinions, or beliefs to 
influence your decision if you are selected to be a juror in this case. 
 
(Tr. p. 35, Ls. 10-15.)  The jurors are presumed to have followed this instruction 
to not let a single statement about Calvillo’s incarceration influence their 
decision.  The record likewise does not show that the single statement about 
Calvillo’s incarceration had any effect whatsoever on the proceedings, let alone 
devastating or continuing impact.  The juror who made the statement was 
removed. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 6-9.)  The potential jurors made no other statements 
about Calvillo being incarcerated  (see generally, Tr., pp. 37-150) and the 
empaneled jurors did not ask any follow-up questions pertaining to the 
incarceration (see Confidential Ex. p. 9; see Tr., p. 537, L. 9 – p. 540, L. 18).  
The victim, just one of the state’s several witnesses, testified in detail regarding 
Calvillo’s crimes.  (Tr., pp. 170-424.)  Lastly, Calvillo was acquitted of one of the 
charges against him (Tr., p. 543, Ls. 1-4), which is completely inconsistent with a 
theory that Calvillo did not receive a fair trial because the jury was infected with 
bias against him.  A review of the record shows that the statement had no effect 
whatsoever on the trial, let alone a continuing, devastating impact. 
 Calvillo contends otherwise, arguing the disclosure of the fact he was 
incarcerated was “inherently prejudicial.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)  Calvillo 
claims the statement “completely undermined” his presumption of innocence 
because it invited harmful speculation, and because the jury would invariably 
know he had been incarcerated for a previous offense, or was convicted of, or 
“was a flight risk for,” this case.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) 
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This line of attack fails first because it gets the presumptions precisely 
backward: the legal standard presumes the jurors were impartial, and presumes 
they followed the instruction not to let the juror comments sway them, rather than 
presuming that the comment invited harmful speculation and wonderment to the 
point of bias.  Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (citing Greer, 483 U.S. at 
766, n. 8).  Moreover, Calvillo cannot explain why, if this comment so thoroughly 
undermined his presumption of innocence, the jury nevertheless found him 
innocent of one of the charges against him.   Here there is no support in the 
record that the jurors engaged in any speculation, much less speculated to the 
point where Calvillo did not receive a fair trial.  This argument accordingly fails. 
 Calvillo analogizes to jail clothing cases, claiming that “[l]ike jail clothes or 
shackles, the jury’s knowledge that a defendant was incarcerated raises serious 
due process concerns.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (citing State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 
288, 293 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 301 (Ct. App. 2001)).) 
 But the jail clothing analogy is unhelpful here, as the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has already resolved the question of whether isolated references to 
incarceration are ipso facto improper.  Similar to the comment here, in State v. 
Hill, the prosecutor inquired of the detective, “What was the date you spoke to 
[the defendant] in jail?”  140 Idaho at 630, 97 P.3d at 1019.  The defendant 
objected to the jail reference and moved for a mistrial.  Id.  The court sustained, 
denied the motion, and issued a curative instruction.  Id. at 630-31, 97 P.3d at 
1019-20.  On appeal, Hill, much like Calvillo, argued that the comment, “which 
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disclosed that she had been in jail, was prejudicial and warranted a mistrial.”  Id. 
at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020. 
  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  Because, as the Court reiterated, 
“[w]here improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial 
court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily 
presumed that the jury obeyed the court’s instruction entirely.”  Id.  Moreover, Hill 
came nowhere near to showing that the remark was “devastating”: 
The court here instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s 
question, and the prosecutor’s disclosure to the jury that Hill had 
been in jail could hardly be characterized as “devastating.” Given 
that Hill was on trial for a criminal offense, even in the absence of 
the prosecutor’s question, any reasonably knowledgeable juror 
likely would have surmised that Hill had at some point been in jail. 
Hill has not demonstrated that she was denied a fair trial. 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying her 
motion for a mistrial. 
Id.   
Here, the Hill holding applies to an even greater degree.  Not only could 
the jury have reasonably surmised that on-trial defendant Calvillo had been 
incarcerated at some point, but in this case they heard that police came to 
Calvillo’s house and “took him” away: 
Q. What happened—after you told her what [Calvillo] was doing, 
how much longer was [Calvillo] living in the house? 
 
A. I think two more days, because the next day, my mom took me 
to a clinic and—or maybe it might have been just one day—and 




(Tr., p. 341, Ls. 19-25.)7  No reasonable juror would be surprised to learn that a 
defendant who was visited and taken by the police—or in other words, 
arrested—had also been incarcerated at some point.8  Given the record here and 
the holding from Hill, Calvillo cannot show that the single comment regarding his 
incarceration was consequential in the least, let alone “devastating,” as he must 
do to show error. 
  Calvillo has failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors did not follow 
the court’s instructions, or that the comment that he was incarcerated had a 
devastating impact on him, or had any continuing impact on the trial.  He 
therefore falls far short of showing that the district court erred by not granting a 
mistrial as a remedy.  Because the jury is presumed to have been impartial and 
to have followed the district’s courts instructions to not let juror comments sway 
them, Calvillo has failed to show the court erred in denying his motion for a 
mistrial. 
D. Calvillo Has Failed To Show A Comment That He “Went Missing” Was 
Prejudicial, Much Less That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion For A Mistrial Based On This Comment 
 
 Calvillo also claims that “it was improper for the jury to learn that 
 
 
                                            
7 Calvillo did not object to this question nor did he move to strike the victim’s 
answer.  (See Tr., pp. 341-42.) 
 
8 Nor would reasonable jurors would be fazed to learn that a defendant, whom 
they heard warned his victim that if she “ever told, that he would go to jail,” in fact 
ended up in jail.  (Tr., p. 361, Ls. 15-18.) 
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Mr. Calvillo ‘went missing’ sometime after 2008.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  He 
contends that this statement was also inherently prejudicial because, like 
excluded evidence showing Calvillo fled his prior trial, it indicated he had a guilty 
conscience.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 (citing R., pp. 120-123).)  Calvillo thinks that 
“the jury was left to speculate” and concludes that “[u]ndoubtedly, questions and 
inferences arose as to when exactly Mr. Calvillo went missing, where he went, 
for how long, and why.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  Calvillo argues that “[l]ike the 
incarceration statement, this statement was inherently prejudicial and therefore 
biased the jury against” him.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) 
 Here again, Calvillo has failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors 
did not follow the court’s instructions or that the comment that he “went missing” 
had a devastating, continuing impact on the trial.  On this point Calvillo again 
inverts the presumptions, speculating about what the jurors might have 
speculated about, rather than showing record-based evidence that the comment 
he “went missing” overcame the judge’s instructions or the jurors’ presumed 
impartiality, or had a devastating continuing impact on the trial.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p. 15.)  The record shows to the contrary that this comment, like the 
incarceration comment, had no impact on the trial.  (See supra, p. 14.) 
Nor can Calvillo hang his hat on the jail-clothing cases, because unlike jail 
clothing, “went missing” on its own has no inherent connection to criminality or 
incarceration.  People innocently go missing for all sorts of non-carceral reasons: 
vacationing coworkers go missing from work, ill classmates go missing from 
school, and famed aviators go missing over the ocean, to name just a few.  And 
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as the district court pointed out, Juror 70 did not couch the “went missing” event 
in the context of this case.  (Tr., p. 37, L. 10 – p. 38, L. 7; p. 155, Ls. 1-3.)  It is 
only with the full knowledge of Calvillo’s multi-year case history could one leap to 
the conclusion that because Calvillo’s former coworker mentioned he went 
missing at some point in time since 2008, that Calvillo must have been harboring 
a guilty conscience and fleeing from authorities in connection with these very 
charges.9  Calvillo concludes that the jury must have rampantly speculated about 
his guilty-conscience but himself only speculates that they did.  He fails to meet 
his burden to show record-based evidence that the comment had a devastating 
impact on the trial. 
 Calvillo argues that the two statements “combined have a prejudicial 
effect,” particularly because the statements were made “almost immediately” 
                                            
9 Calvillo tries to connect the “went missing” comments with the state’s prior 
attempt to introduce evidence of his flight, but this attempt founders.  Prior to trial 
the state did not simply seek to introduce the isolated fact that Calvillo “went 
missing” as evidence of his guilty conscience; it specifically sought to introduce 
evidence that he fled to Mexico during the prior trial.  (R., p. 93; see also Tr., p. 
8.)  Likewise, the district court did not rule that Calvillo’s disappearance, 
examined in a vacuum, was prejudicial; it specifically held that the flight 
evidence, and Calvillo’s explanations for it, could not be brought before the jury 
without also informing them of his prior trial and prior conviction.  (R., pp. 122-23 
(“[I]f the circumstances of the defendant’s prior jury trial and the outcome of that 
trial were before the new jury the prejudicial effect of the prior trial proceedings 
would substantially outweigh the probative value of the flight evidence in the 
State’s case in chief.”).)  Contrary to Calvillo’s assertion, the statement that a 
coworker knew Calvillo from 2008 until he “went missing” did not necessarily 
place the flight during the same time as the alleged abuse.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p. 15.)  Nor does an out-of-context “went missing” statement come 
anywhere near implying there had been a prior trial, much less a conviction.  The 
district court’s pre-trial ruling on the flight evidence therefore has no bearing on 





after “[t]he entire jury panel was read the charging document of nine sex 
offenses against a child.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  Calvillo thus claims “it 
cannot be said that this chain of events did not prejudice the jury against 
Mr. Calvillo.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  This argument fails because the standard 
of assessing the continuing impact of one claimed error on the trial does not 
require this Court to combine all the alleged errors together.  Moreover, even if 
this Court were to deploy an aggregated chain-of-events theory, the first link in 
the prejudicial chain could never be the statements of the charges against the 
defendant.  Jurors need to be told of, and of course frequently revisit, the 
charges a defendant stands accused of.  No workable standard of prejudice 
could include statements of the charges themselves as compounding factors for 
a mistrial, lest every trial of a serious crime end before it begins. 
 Lastly, Calvillo finds fault in the district court’s actions by noting that 
“[m]oreover, the district court provided no specific curative instruction for these 
statements.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  The state contends that the district court 
correctly ruled that its prior instruction, given at the beginning of voir dire, 
inoculated the jurors against the statements that were made and cured any 
prejudice that could have arisen.  (See Tr. p. 35, Ls. 10-15; p. 155, Ls. 3-19.)   
To the extent Calvillo now wishes to claim another instruction should have been 
subsequently given, he has waived that claim because he never presented it to 
the district court below.  Garcia–Rodriguez, 2017 WL 2569786, *3 (June 14, 
2017) (“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, 
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to 
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the lower court.”).  Calvillo never requested a follow-up curative instruction as 
part of his mistrial motion nor did he identify the lack of an instruction as part of 
his theory for relief below.  (See Tr., p. 152, L. 6 – p. 154, L. 14.)  
In fact, Calvillo lobbied for exactly the opposite when he warned against 
the dangers of mentioning the comments again, and specifically sought a mistrial 
because he claimed there was no way to “correct” the comments without 
highlighting” them: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge. During the Court’s 
examination of the jury panel, two jurors expressed some 
knowledge of the case. Specifically, one juror, who ultimately was 
excused, indicated that she had knowledge of Mr. Calvillo “while he 
was incarcerated.” That was the quote.  
 
A second juror, who I believe was excused, indicated that he had a 
professional relationship with Mr. Calvillo and that he knew him 
when he, quote, “went missing,” unquote. Of course, the Court did 
not follow up with questions concerning that, nor did either counsel, 
because I think it was fraught with disaster, but, at this point in 
time, the two jurors have infected, if you will, the entire panel with 
information related to Mr. Calvillo’s incarceration, the jailing of 
Mr. Calvillo, and with information that in someway, somehow, he 
went missing which, I believe, suggests that he ran from these 
charges. That certainly would be a reasonable interpretation of 
that. Every juror in the courtroom heard it. There is, I don’t believe, 
any way to correct it without highlighting it. 
 
Under those circumstances, it is my position that a mistrial should 
be declared in this case. 
 
(Tr., p. 152, L. 6 – p. 153, L. 6 (emphasis added).)  Because Calvillo not only 
failed to argue another instruction should be given, but made a case for not 
giving one below, any error in not doing so was arguably invited by him (see 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 239-240, 985 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1999)), and is 
not preserved as an issue on appeal.   
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In sum, Calvillo has failed to show that the “went missing” comment was 
all prejudicial to him, much less that it had a devastating impact on the trial.  With 
respect to both comments, the district court correctly concluded that a mistrial 
was not necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Calvillo’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 1st day of August, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans____________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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